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
JOINT VISION 2010: A UNILATERAL VISION FOR
A MULTILATERAL FUTURE

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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<p>15. Abstract: Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) is the operational template guiding the services toward achieving new joint force capabilities. These capabilities, applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict, are based on four new operational concepts that are enabled by technology and information superiority.</p> <p>Applying JV 2010 across the entire spectrum of conflict without understanding the fundamental differences between war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) assumes risk. MOOTW will continue to be prevalent, and its' fundamental nature precludes relying on information superiority and the four new concepts as touchstones for future conflict. An appreciation of asymmetrical threats exists in current joint doctrine but is not translated to the JV 2010 operational blueprint.</p> <p>The time is now to accurately reflect future U.S. capabilities to the National Command Authority (NCA). JV 2010 should be the operational linchpin connecting the strategic decision-makers with the proper application of military force into a challenging and demanding future. Effective strategy cannot be developed based on inaccurate operational capabilities. Assuming JV 2010 is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict is the first step in a flawed process.</p>			
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Abstract of

JOINT VISION 2010: A UNILATERAL VISION FOR A MULTILATERAL FUTURE

Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) is the operational template guiding the services toward achieving new joint force capabilities. These capabilities, applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict, are based on four new operational concepts that are enabled by technology and information superiority.

Applying JV 2010 across the entire spectrum of conflict without understanding the fundamental differences between war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) assumes risk. MOOTW will continue to be prevalent, and its' fundamental nature precludes relying on information superiority and the four new concepts as touchstones for future conflict. An appreciation of asymmetrical threats exists in current joint doctrine but is not translated to the JV 2010 operational blueprint.

The time is now to accurately reflect future U.S. capabilities to the National Command Authority (NCA). JV 2010 should be the operational linchpin connecting the strategic decision-makers with the proper application of military force into a challenging and demanding future. Effective strategy cannot be developed based on inaccurate operational capabilities. Assuming JV 2010 is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict is the first step in a flawed process.

The term "Small War" is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.

Small Wars Manual
U.S. Marine Corpsⁱ

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) in July of 1996. This document provided a framework that the Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010 fleshed out in May 1997. The Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) lays out an operational template to guide all the services along a transformation process to achieve new joint force capabilities embodied in four new operational concepts. The concepts are: 1) dominant maneuver, 2) precision engagement, 3) full-dimensional protection and 4) focused logistics. These concepts are enabled by information superiority and technological innovation to achieve, "... **Full Spectrum Dominance** – a joint team *persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.*"ⁱⁱ

The confirmation that we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) has generated debate on the veracity of JV 2010 and the CFJO. The CFJO establishes the framework from which future assessments will transform JV 2010 ideas into joint force capabilities.ⁱⁱⁱ This framework and the new operational concepts are described as applicable to the entire spectrum of conflict. If the CFJO will set the conceptual framework for discussion, it is useful to evaluate how applicable this framework is to the full spectrum of conflict. This paper will compare both the operational natures of irregular or unconventional warfare and the principles of military

operations other than war (MOOTW), against the CFJO concepts. If the CFJO concepts do not fully support MOOTW, then we assume a measure of risk. The National Command Authority (NCA) must recognize this risk when the use of military force is contemplated.

WHY ARE MOOTW IMPORTANT NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE?

The National Security Strategy (NSS), "emphasizes worldwide engagement and the enlargement of the community of free market democracies."^{iv} To support the NSS, the National Military Strategy, "... calls for flexible and selective engagement, involving a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and help shape the evolving international environment."^v These strategies reflect an energetic approach to integrate the nation's military power in a significantly greater way than was previously accepted. Most of the military activity will support the NMS components of peacetime engagement, and deterrence and conflict prevention -- MOOTW.

The increased employment of military force across such an expansive spectrum of operations is a relatively recent occurrence. This is a fundamental change resulting from the development of a new global political and economic reality during the Twentieth Century. The scope of U.S. national interest has expanded as global engagement has taken on greater importance. This has led to more areas in the world where situations outside our political jurisdiction impact our national interest. Global interests, which were previously exercised by vast transnational or colonial empires, are of important and ever increasing relevance to the U.S. These interests cover the entire spectrum of social, political, economic, and security issues. The U.S. NSS emphasizes engagement and will

only exacerbate this process, increasing the number of areas of national interest. By default this will lead to an increase in the number of situations requiring the employment of our military.^{vi}

The usefulness of MOOTW from the political perspective is the wide range of options available to the NCA for using military force in conjunction with other force options to influence events.^{vii} The triad of options are grouped under deterrence, forward presence and crisis response. A menu of fifteen individually defined missions within these options provides the NCA with a broad spectrum of diplomatic means to protect and promote U.S. interests.

HOW DOES THE NATURE OF MOOTW SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFER WITH THAT OF WAR?

Joint Pub 3-07 describes the differences between war and MOOTW. War is, “[W]hen the instruments of national power are unable to achieve national objectives or protect national interests any other way, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state.”^{viii} MOOTW is focused, “...on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.”^{ix}

From a strictly military viewpoint, two types of relationships--supported and supporting--characterize the distinguishing factors between war and MOOTW. In war the military is the supported element. Political dominance is subordinated to the degree necessary for the military to gain control of the situation. Once military objectives are

achieved, policymakers then take over to bring hostilities to an end. During MOOTW, the military becomes a supporting agency. Military actions have less unilateral impact and are conducted as one element of a grand political strategy. The U.S. military is only one of many agencies involved.

THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FACING U.S. MILITARY FORCES CONDUCTING MOOTW

West Africa is becoming *the* symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real "strategic" danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation-states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.^x

The CFJO recognizes many of the factors impacting the world environment. It translates these factors into future concerns which operational commanders must consider in their planning process. These concerns include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, environmental catastrophes, regional competitors seeking limited aims, and criminal organizations with access to enhanced technologies.^{xi} One model from the host of future possibilities to assess CFJO vulnerability and relevance will include a large, generally urban population living in poverty. Starvation, disease, and pollution will be rampant. Violence will be a dominant factor in a society with few remaining structural underpinnings. Sects, tribes, or other associations will be vying to control the few remaining resources of wealth or survival. Most indigenous societal infrastructure will be decaying and an identifiable government framework may or may not be present.

The enemy will be a hybrid between what we currently define as insurgent, revolutionary, and terrorist. Unconventional or irregular warfare will be the primary tool he uses to achieve his goals. Unifying factors for this enemy span religious, cultural, tribal and ethnic associations and nationalism. This opponent will have access to limited technology but will be politically astute both among the internal population and with respect to the external world.

The generic environment outlined above will impact our force employment and operational capability. Future U.S. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) will operate under a much larger umbrella including representatives from other U.S. governmental agencies, multi-national forces, private volunteer organizations (autonomous or semi-autonomous), non-governmental organizations and local or regional representatives of the remaining government. Furthermore, the national and international media will cover the entire operation. U.S. forces will find themselves dealing with the entire spectrum of operations from humanitarian assistance, to peacemaking, counterinsurgency and peace enforcement.

This scenario demonstrates several weaknesses of the CFJO in MOOTW. The large number of additional participants within the area of operations prohibits the full exploitation of joint force capabilities. An example is Operation Restore Hope. In Somalia the U.S. shouldered a disproportionate logistic burden while part of the multinational force. Incompatibility of equipment, logistics doctrine, logistic mobility and infrastructure are just a few of the problems that preclude focused logistics from becoming reality.

In addition, the CFJO concept of full-dimensional protection attempts to place an umbrella of protection over; "...our military forces, critical host-nation facilities and areas, and coalition forces as required."^{xii} Protecting the civilian personnel, military personnel and host nation facilities when we do not exercise direct control over them is problematic at best. When the full potential of these concepts is not achieved, the gaining of full spectrum dominance is lost. All concepts are supposed to reinforce each other to create a synergistic affect that leads to new operational capability. The model we are applying these concepts against does not appear to support the end state desired.

HOW APPLICABLE ARE INFORMATION SUPERIORITY AND THE CFJO CONCEPTS OF DOMINANT MANEUVER AND FOCUSED LOGISTICS TO MOOTW IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODEL WE ESTABLISHED?

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Information superiority is, "...the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."^{xiii} The complexity and importance of information in warfare is too broad a topic to fully explore in this paper. However, two perspectives on this subject will shed light on vulnerabilities that are part and parcel of the benefits accrued from information superiority.

The first observation about information as an enabler enhancing our military operational capability is, "What vulnerability does our emphasis on information superiority provide to our adversaries?" The answer presented to Congress during two house subcommittee meetings in April 1997 are cogently described in the following statements. "The U.S. susceptibility to hostile offensive information warfare is real and will continue to increase until many current practices are abandoned."^{xiv} "It's not well understood that we have this tremendous vulnerability."^{xv} Many DOD systems rely on

vulnerable telecomputing services, and global proliferation of IW hardware and software has expanded the potential avenues of attack by our competitors.

A second vulnerability can be extracted from articles like Christopher Centner's, *Precision-Guided Propaganda: Exploiting the U.S. Information Advantage in Peacetime*. Centner envisioned information technology providing us an unexploited avenue through which to conduct selective propaganda campaigns in support of military operations. He failed to consider the insulation provided to a poor, uneducated, technologically dysfunctional society. This insulation provides a degree of protection that the American public, with its media and Internet fascination, does not enjoy. Since the strategic center of gravity for employment of troops in MOOTW is seen as U.S. popular support, we must view technology as increasing our vulnerability, not our opponents'.

Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, in testimony by the Procurement Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee in Congress on 20 March 1997 discussed the U.S. Marine Corps' approach to the command and control environment. He emphasized the need not to get too enamored with information superiority because uncertainty and doubt will still dominate the future battlefield. He described the fundamental flaw in information superiority when responding to a defense publication statement that, "If we had today's sensors, we would have won Vietnam."^{xvi} He stated, "Vietnam represents a failure of flawed strategy and operational concepts that no amount of sensor data could solve. 'Seeing' things and designating targets is not the same as wisdom."^{xvii}

DOMINANT MANEUVER

Dominant Maneuver is "...the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, sea, land, and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks."^{xviii} The major difference between this concept and traditional maneuver is that "...dominant maneuver

seeks to position an array of air, land, sea, and space capabilities to mass a broader range of effect."^{xix} This concept is grounded on the assumption that information superiority will provide, "[P]recise, immediate combat/operational assessment capability."^{xx}

Increased lethality, survivability, and mobility of future forces in conjunction with battlespace awareness are the underlying principles of dominant maneuver. The U.S. Marine Corps has experimented with Sea Dragon^{xxi}, a concept of maneuver in order to engage by fires vice the reverse. This technique (capability) is specifically addressed under the CFJO's concept of dominant maneuver. The ability to mass effects without massing forces is useful in some scenarios. However, the technique is not effective when you are confronted with a popularly supported militia. This was proven in Vietnam when militia type forces located "Sting Ray" teams. Instead of performing their primary mission they found themselves fighting for their own lives while awaiting rescue by friendly forces.^{xxii}

The U.S. Marine Corps will conduct Urban Warrior, an Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), in September 1998. Problems and solutions to the future urban battlefield will be explored. The emphasis for Urban Warrior is centered on, "direct vice indirect fires and the employment of maneuvering ground forces."^{xxiii} Understanding the need to operate in this demanding environment, the Marine Corps has focused on the individual warfighter. The operational applicability of dominant maneuver when confronted with an urban environment is tenuous at best. The Marine Corps recognizes the limited value of the previously discussed Sea Dragon technique in an urban environment. They will focus on the individual Marine and his direct fire capability in the future urban battlefield.

FM 100-23, Peace Operations states, "In peace operations, maneuver may contribute to achieving situational advantage over a belligerent rather than destruction of an enemy."^{xxiv} The level of consent, level of force and degree of impartiality are key variables in this environment. These variables are loosely tied to the MOOTW principles

of restraint and legitimacy. Restraint seeks to employ force prudently. Legitimacy is the perception by the 'audience' that appropriate actions using judicious force are performed in a fair manner. Legitimacy is often a decisive point in MOOTW.

FOCUSED LOGISTICS

Focused logistics is "...the fusion of information, logistics and transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis response, to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly at the strategic, operational and tactical level of operations."^{xxv} Two elements in multinational operations, equipment interoperability and logistic support system coordination will directly limit the focused logistics concept. The CFJO does much to guide an improved U.S. logistic capability, but has no vision for solving the problems associated with large multinational operations.

As discussed in Jeffrey B. White's article, *Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare*, irregular forces are much more logistic independent due to their organization. Their food and ammunition needs are simpler and the requirement to move great distances does not exist. "There are no rail or road nets to attack, no ammunition dumps to bomb, no bridges to knock out. It also is difficult to separate irregulars from their weapons and to find arms caches when they exist close to the people."^{xxvi} The dichotomy between irregular operations and U.S. operations reveals attackable vulnerabilities with both modes of operations.

DO THE PRINCIPLES OF MOOTW REINFORCE THE CFJO CONCEPTS?

The insurgent, the counterinsurgent, the peace enforcer and the peace keeper all have the same goal: political authority over a specified population in a defined geographic venue. The insurgent has two tools with which he hopes to accomplish this goal. The counterinsurgent has two tools, which he seeks to achieve his end. The peace enforcer and the peace keeper, even the military purveyor of humanitarian relief, carry two tools whose use they hope will bring success. In all cases the tools are identical: popular perceptions of legitimacy and a credible capacity to coerce. It is the understanding of each of these tools as well as the relationship between them and the specifics of their application which determine success or failure in the field.^{xxvii}

Dr. Cable's ideas on popular perception of legitimacy and credible capacity to coerce demonstrate the importance of the three unique principles of MOOTW. These principles are restraint, perseverance and legitimacy. They are operationally significant and embedded in all of our joint doctrine published for MOOTW. But do the unique MOOTW principles support CFJO concepts?

The key disparity when considering the principles of MOOTW in relations to the CFJO is the lack of agreement on tempo at the operational level. The dominant maneuver and precision engagement concepts attempt to overcome the restrictions of a linear battlespace and generate tempo. The principles of MOOTW emphasize long term, deliberate application of minimum force to build up legitimacy. These principles operate in an environment where the classic linear battlespace often does not exist. In counterinsurgency operations the, "[D]eep operations at the strategic and operational levels will often tend to be political, diplomatic, and psychological in nature."^{xxviii} So these different approaches are rooted in the different nature of operations in war and MOOTW as discussed in the model previously presented.

CFJO bares remarkable similarities to the institutional wisdom prior to Vietnam, which recognized technology as providing an edge in firepower. Firepower was enhanced further through mobility, which when integrated with an effective communication system provided for "fire and maneuver." This foundation led to

doctrine, which emphasized armored and mechanized combat on the battlefields of Europe.^{xxix} These attempts at vision assumed the concepts applied to “small wars” as well.

Today’s problem is not doctrine. We have doctrine developed and written to accomplish missions throughout the full spectrum of conflict. The problem is establishing a guiding vision that inherently recognizes what doctrine already does. The nature of MOOTW is significantly different than that of war, and assuming a vision based on one, applied to the other, lacks relevance.

HOW DID JOINT VISION 2010 LOSE ITS FOCUS?

JV 2010 and the CFJO is a product of the environment in which it was developed. Reductions in personnel and reductions in budgets have dramatically affected the Department of Defense over the last several years. However, there has been no quantifiable reduction in military missions and operations. As a result, the CFJO attempts to empower fewer people with a greater capability to handle the same workload. As civilian and military leaders at all levels become engaged in preparing forces for the challenges of the 21st century, this environment will continue to shape the military. These constraints form the box from which the total capability package of the U.S. military must be drawn, and more importantly, applied to the challenging and uncertain future.

WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THIS ANALYSIS?

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.

Sun Tzu^{xxx}

JV 2010 and the CFJO are the first steps in the right approach to emphasize and promote unity of effort to think about and prepare for the future. The primary focus-- "Being ready to fight and win the Nation's wars remains our foremost responsibility and the prime consideration governing all our activities."^{xxx} Therefore, creating robust joint task force capabilities are in our national interest. What is not in the national best interest is unquestioning acceptance that the CFJO will work equally well throughout the entire spectrum of conflict.

The U.S. military is enamored with mobility, firepower, technology and information. In the midst of the post Cold War drawdown the military has focused on the technological and informational advantage we enjoy throughout the world to build our future capacity. However, this capacity is centered on conducting large-scale combat operations, not on conducting the operations forces are most involved in--MOOTW.

The "new" concepts of CFJO are not applicable to many of the situations the military will face in MOOTW. The nature of the environment with an asymmetrical unconventional threat restricts the employment of technology and limits its effectiveness as a force multiplier. The impact of individual action becomes critical in reducing violence and maintaining legitimacy during these operations. Information superiority will not serve as a panacea, and should be replaced with the concept situational awareness in MOOTW. Operational and tactical situational awareness will be a useful force multiplier here. A force that equips, trains and employs with this goal in mind will prove more effective.

JV 2010 and the CFJO are missing a golden opportunity to properly frame the military debate. They need to accurately portray the capabilities we need, and those we hope to have, in relation to the environment and mission. By acknowledging what the military can and can't do at the operational level, we can help guide the strategic discussion of where and how best to employ forces. The CFJO can then link operational reality with strategic decision making to ensure unity of effort. It can achieve this only

after acknowledging its' limitation, and the growing prevalence of MOOTW in future conflicts. Then the strategic leaders will have the situational awareness to develop sound strategy. The military can at that time expect to be operationally successful supporting that strategy. We need look no farther than the Germans in WWII, the U.S. in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the United Nations in Somalia to see the futility of operationally supporting bad strategy.

ⁱ United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington: 1940), 1.

ⁱⁱ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, May 1997, ii

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid, p. ii

^{iv} National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, February 1995, i.

^v Ibid.

^{vi} The White House, "A National Security Strategy For A New Century", May 1997

^{vii} List of options include Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism, Show of Force, Raid, Strike, Peacekeeping, NEO, Nation Assistance, Counterinsurgency, Freedom of Navigation, Counterdrug, Humanitarian Assistance, Protection of Shipping, U.S. Civil Support

^{viii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), I-1.

^{ix} Ibid.

^x Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, 46.

^{xi} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, May 1997, 8-10.

^{xii} Ibid, 53.

^{xiii} Ibid, i.

^{xiv} Jack Weible, "Vulnerable to Attack?," Air Force Times, 14 April 1997, 28:4-6.

^{xv} Ibid.

^{xvi} LtGen Paul K. Van Riper, "Information Superiority," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1997, 57.

^{xvii} Ibid.

^{xviii} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, May 1997, 49.

^{xix} Ibid, 49.

^{xx} Ibid, 51.

^{xxi} Bill Lind, "Sea Dragon: A Critique", 4.

^{xxii} LtCol Gary W. Schenkel, "The Transition from Hunter To Urban Warrior," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1997, 27-28.

^{xxiii} Ibid, 27.

^{xxiv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 1995), II-5.

^{xxv} Joint Chiefs of Staff, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, May 1997, 54.

^{xxvi} Jeffrey B. White, "Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare", Studies in Intelligence, May 1996, 54.

^{xxvii} Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War", 2.

^{xxviii} G. Bulloch, The Application of Military Doctrine to Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: A British Perspective, "Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1996, 256.

^{xxix} Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War", 12.

^{xxx} Thomas R. Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics (Harrisburg, PA: Telegraph Press, 1941), 26.

^{xxxi} National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, February 1995.

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